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TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The tourth amendment *-~ 4-u~

"^J*---*

stages ~r nst i t .f Ion

The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or thI ngs to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-69 (1953 as amended) provides in
pertinent parti
(l)(a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move
right or left upon a roadway or change lanes until
the movement can I =;? made with reasonable safety
and an aporopria-; c"-i«]nal has be^n given.
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-1(37) I I";

.s amended) provides:

"Roadway" means that portion , 4J.ghway improved,
designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel,
exclusive of a sidewalk, berm or shoulder, even
though any of them are used by persons riding
bicycles or other human powered vehicles. If a
highway includes two or more separate roadways,
roadway refers to any roadway separately but not
- • •. ' roadways collectively.

No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection
unless the vehicle is in a proper position upon
the roadway, as required in §12.44.120, or its
successor, or turn a vehicle to enter a private
road or driveway, or otherwise turn a vehicle from
a direct course, or move right or left upon a
roadway unless and until such movement can be made
with reasonable safety. No person shall turn any
vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in
the manner hereinafter provided in the event any
other traffic may be affected by si ich movement.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 20, 1988, at approximately midnight, Salt
Lake City Police Officer Bruce Smith was on patrol, driving
northbound on State Street in a marked police vehicle (Transcript
dated November 1, 1988, hereinafter "T" at 8 ) . The officer noticed
a vehicle parked on the right-hand side of the road with the front
passenger window down (T. 9 ) . The officer could not identify as to
sex the person who was standing on the sidewalk and leaning inside
the car through the open window (T. 9, 38, 40).
The person leaning inside the car stood up and walked
onto the property of the Alta Motel, which was immediately to the
right of where the vehicle was parked (T. 9, Defendant's
Exhibit 1 ) , The officer considered the area to be a "drug area" and
testified that he became "suspicious" after seeing the individual
leaning through the car window (T. 13).
The vehicle moved forward a few feet and turned right
into a driveway which had been directly in front of it. That
driveway led to the parking lot of the Alta Motel (T. 9, 10,
Defendant's Exhibit 1). The vehicle never pulled out of the
traveled portion of the road (T. 14). It traveled on the right-hand
parking portion of the road and did not veer left into traffic
before turning (T. 40).
The officer pulled into the parking lot behind the
vehicle and placed his police car behind the vehicle so that the
vehicle could not move (T. 9, 14). The officer testified that "the
reason that I stopped him was no signal" (T. 14, 53). The officer
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card, I'm talking to him, I had the hand held. I
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"he

asked them to do a local county NCIC want check
(T. 44).
The officer filled in a field interrogation card on
Mr. Smith.

The officer explained that "a FI card is used for any

number of reasons.

Usually it's to record a contact with any

person, whether they be arrested, cited on suspicious activity,
known bandits out and about, we just make a note of it, run it
through our machine records unit, and that is distributed to all law
enforcement agencies in the valley as well as individually to each
of our detectives" (T. 46). The officer explained that he
field-carded Mr. Smith because "he's a convicted person, because I
had stopped him at the Alta Motel, and because I wanted other
agencies to be aware that Mr. Smith had been stopped, and
subsequently arrested in case they would have had any dealings with
him, or were looking at him in any other capacity of their job"
(T. 53-4).

The office later acknowledged that he field-carded

Mr. Smith based on both suspicious activity and the fact that he was
a "known" person (T. 55; see also T. 58-9).
The officer ran a warrant check on Mr. Smith and, at some
point prior to obtaining information through that check, asked
Mr. Smith "what he had been arrested for" and learned that Mr. Smith
had been convicted of a narcotics violation (T. 18). It is unclear
from the transcript whether this occurred before or after Officer
Smith filled out the field interrogation card.

Officer Smith also

discovered that a warrant based on a parole violation existed for
Mr. Smith (T. 18-19).
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during that time (T. 22-3).
Officer Smith did not remember either himself or the
backup officer asking whether Mr. Smith had items of value in the
car (T. 23). The backup officer found two Ziploc baggies with a
white powdery substance inside and some bindles which she showed to
Officer Smith (T. 24, 63, 69). She did not approach the Appellant
or show him what she had found (T. 63).
The backup officer acknowledged that when she inventoried
a vehicle, she was required to include a copy of the citation in the
paperwork (T. 64-5).

In this case, she did not see a citation for

improper turning or improper registration (T. 65).
The officers gave Mr. Smith no opportunity to protest the
disposition of his belongings, and Mr. Smith did not make any such
protestation (T. 57, 58).
Neither Officer Smith nor the backup officer gave
Mr. Smith his Miranda warnings (T. 24-5, 29, 64). Officer Smith did
advise Mr. Smith that he was under arrest for possession of
controlled substances as well as a parole or probation violation
(T. 25). While enroute to jail, Officer Smith talked with the
Appellant regarding his narcotics source and "asked him if he would
cooperate with Metro if they wanted to use him" (T. 26).
The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress
statements made in violation of the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution (T. 90-1, R. 27). The trial court denied defendant's
motion to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle (T. 85-89,
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ARGUMENT

POINT I. THE DETENTION OF MR, SMITH AND THE
SUBSEQUENT SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE VIOLATED THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION,
The trial judge based his denial of Mr. Smith's motion to
suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle on two grounds:

(a)

that a "stop" or "seizure" had not occurred (T. 85-89) and (b) that
even if a seizure did occur, the officer would have been unable to
lawfully detain Mr. Smith for a traffic violation (T. 88-90).
Contrary to the trial judge's ruling, a seizure did occur in the
instant case and the officer lacked adequate grounds for stopping
the vehicle.

A. WHEN OFFICER SMITH STOPPED MR. SMITH'S
VEHICLE, A SEIZURE OCCURRED.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
While this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have
recognized that not all encounters between police and citizens
amount to "seizures" (see State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987)
(per curiam); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987)),
where a "seizure" does occur, the requirements of the fourth
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the street and questions him, if the person is willing to listen."
(Citations omitted.)

739 P.2d at 87-88.

While a brief encounter

with a citizen on the street may not amount to a "seizure" under
some circumstances, the stopping of a vehicle and the detention of
its occupants constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the
fourth and fourteenth amendments.

See State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119,

123 (Utah 1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
In Deitman, an officer followed a white truck from the
scene of a burglary.

The truck stopped in front of a house a few

blocks away, and the officer parked across the street and waited for
the occupants to get out of the vehicle.
pair and asked if he could speak to them."

The officer yelled to the
The pair crossed the

street and, when asked for identification, provided some.

The

officer ran a warrants check and found an outstanding warrant
against one of the co-defendants.

However, he arrested neither

person at that time.
In a per curiam opinion, the Utah Supreme Court held that
this initial encounter was not a seizure within the meaning of the
fourth amendment.

The Court pointed out:

The officer was justified in asking defendants for
identification and an explanation of their
presence in an area where police had responded to
a burglar alarm. Defendants were not detained
against their will and were not arrested at this
time.
Deitman, 739 P.2d at 618.
Unlike the situation in Deitman, the officer in the
present case parked his vehicle directly behind that of the

- 10 -

defendant, prohibiting the defendant from driving away.

Also in

contrast to Deitman, although the record is not clear, the officer
apparently used either his overheads or spotlight to signal the
defendant to stop (T. 15, 41-2).1

Unlike the officer in Deitman,

the officer in the instant case approached the defendant's car,
making it clear that he planned to talk with the defendant (T. 17).
In addition, when the officer ran a warrants check on Mr. Smith, the
defendant apparently was seated in the police car, unlike the
defendants in Deitman who were standing on the sidewalk.

Finally,

unlike the defendants in Deitman, the defendant in the present case
was not free to leave after the encounter concluded.

in contrast,

Mr. Smith was placed in the squad car shortly after the "stop" of
his vehicle and subsequently transported to the jail.
The nature of the detention in State v. Swanigan, 699
P.2d 719 (Utah 1985) (per curiam), is comparable to the detention in
the present case.

in Swanigan, the officer ordered the defendant

1 In the affidavit of defense counsel filed in support of
the motion for rehearing on the motion to suppress, defense counsel
stated in part that the defendant had told her
(a) Officer B. L. Smith stopped behind him
with flashing overhead lights while he was parked
on the untraveled portion of the street.
(b) When the officer pulled behind him
with his overhead lights, defendant then pulled
into the Alta Motel parking lot.
(c) The officer immediately requested the
defendant to show his arms and the officer then
inspected them for track marks.
The defendant's testimony clarifies the gaps in Officer Smith's
testimony and comports with the reasonable inference drawn from the
officer's testimony—that he used either overhead lights or a
spotlight to effectuate the stop. See discussion, infra, at 13-14.
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and his companion to stop and then requested identification.

He ran

a warrants check on the pair after backup officers had arrived and
arrested the defendant based on an outstanding warrant.

The

Swanigan court found that a seizure had occurred under the
circumstances and that such seizure was unreasonable.
The only difference between the seizure in the instant
case and the seizure in Swanigan is that the pair in Swanigan was
walking and the officer ordered them to stop, whereas in the instant
case, the defendant was driving and the officer apparently signaled
him in some way to stop, then blocked his ability to drive away.

In

both cases, the officer made it clear that the defendant was to
stop, and a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have
believed he was not free to leave.
In State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 675 (Utah 1986), an officer
followed a vehicle for a while, then turned on the red flashing
lights on his patrol car.

The vehicle being followed turned into a

driveway of a house where one of the occupants of the car resided.
In Carpena, the court did not discuss whether a seizure occurred;
instead, it simply assumed that a seizure occurred and held that
such seizure was unreasonable.
The present case is distinguishable from Carpena only by
the fact that the officer could not remember whether he used his
overhead lights or spotlight to stop the defendant.

However, the

reasonable inference to be drawn from Officer Smith's testimony as a
whole is that he used either his overheads or his spotlight to
effectuate the stop.

(See discussion, infra, at 13-14.)
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Furthermore/ the appellant should not be penalized for
the officer's failure to remember the details of a stop.

The burden

is on the State in this case to establish that the warrantless
search was lawful.

See State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah

1984); State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1986).

The State,

therefore, is required to establish that no seizure occurred or
that, if one did, it was valid and that the subsequent inventory
search of the vehicle was lawful.

The testimony of the officer

regarding his use of either the overheads or spotlight to effectuate
the stop raises an inference that the officer used something to
effectuate the stop and establishes that the State has failed to
prove that the officer did not seize Mr. Smith.
The facts of the instant case establish that a "seizure"
occurred in this case; this was not a "level one" encounter as
described in Merritt.

The officer repeatedly referred to his

actions as "stopping" the vehicle (T. 14, 15, 41-2, 53-4).

He

stated that"[t]hat was the reason that I stopped him was no signal"
(T. 14) (emphasis added).

He also stated:

During that time, I do not remember the
overheads. I usually do turn them off after a
stop is affected, so I donft remember whether I
used my overheads to stop him or not.
(T. 14-15) (emphasis added).
When asked on cross-examination by the prosecutor through
the use of a leading question, "You didn't have on your lights or
anything at that point?," the officer responded, "I don't remember
whether I turned on my overheads or used my spotlight" (T. 41-2).
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As

previously stated, this implies that the officer used either his
overheads or his spotlight to effectuate the stop and simply could
not remember which he had chosen.
Furthermore, the officer repeatedly acknowledged that he
stopped Mr. Smith based on a failure to signal and that he told
Mr. Smith that that was the reason he had stopped him (T. 14, 52-3).
Although Officer Smith could not remember whether he used his
overheads or spotlight to effectuate the stop, the totality of his
testimony indicates that he required Mr. Smith to stop his vehicle
and that, after the vehicle was stopped, Mr. Smith was not free to
leave.
The prosecutorfs attempts to characterize this as a level
one encounter and not a seizure fly directly in the face of the
officer's characterization of the stop.

The officer's affirmative

response to the prosecutor's leading question could simply have meant
that the officer did not use a gun or physical force to require the
stop and not that he did not stop or seize the defendant.

Such

response, when considered in the context of the totality of the
officer's testimony, is not sufficient to support a conclusion that
no seizure occurred.
In addition, the actions of the officer in calling a
backup officer immediately after arriving indicate an intention to
detain Mr. Smith.

Although the officer attempted to explain the call

for backup based on a safety rationale, the totality of his testimony
does not suggest safety concerns, and the officer who arrived shortly
after the call was immediately put to work inventorying the vehicle
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(T. 62-65).

Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, a reasonable

person in Mr. Smith's position would believe he was not free to leave
as the result of Officer Smith's call for backup.
Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, a
reasonable person in the defendant's position would believe that he
was not free to leave, and, therefore, a seizure occurred.

The trial

court erred in ruling that no seizure occurred in this case
(T. 85-89).

Of particular note is the following clarification which

the trial judge made of his ruling:
Q (by Ms. Palacios): What about the officer
saying that he had stopped to give him a ticket.
Isn't that evidence of a stop?
THE COURT: No. That means the police officer was
going to pull him over to give him a ticket, but
never did. You can't have a stop by a police
officer unless the person pulls over because of
the police officers. I think that's pretty clear.
(T. 92). For entire transcript of trial court's ruling and
clarification, see Addendum A, pp. 91-92.

This colloquy indicates

the erroneous nature of the trial court's determination that no
seizure occurred.

The trial court simply disregarded the evidence

in this case.
The State has failed to establish that no seizure
occurred in this case, and the trial court erred in ruling otherwise.

B. OFFICER SMITH'S DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANT WAS
A PRETEXT STOP AND WAS NOT BASED ON A REASONABLE
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WAS
AFOOT.
The trial judge concluded that even if a seizure occurred
in the present case, Officer Smith had a reasonable articulable
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suspicion to justify such detention (T. 88). The Court stated:
And had he not voluntarily stopped, he could have
pulled him over for that traffic violation. I
don't see anything wrong with that.
Such a ruling was contrary to applicable case law and in violation
of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States
Supreme Court carved a limited exception to the general probable
cause requirement contained in the fourth amendment.

The Court held

that under appropriate circumstances, a brief detention of a person,
absent probable cause to arrest, is permissible.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).

See also

This limited exception is

tailored to balance the government's interest in effective law
enforcement against the individual's liberty, privacy and personal
security interests.

In balancing these competing considerations,

the Supreme Court has stressed that a central concern has been "to
assure that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not
subject to arbitrary invasion solely at the unfettered discretion of
officers in the field."

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).

In justifying a particular detention, an officer must be
able to point to specific articulable facts which, when viewed under
an objective standard, create a reasonable suspicion that the
defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime.

Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
This Court has reiterated the Terry Court's insistence on such a
standard, cautioning that n[a]nything less would invite intrusions
upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more
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substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this court has
consistently refused to sanction.

And simple 'good faith on the

part of the arresting officer1 is not enough . . . .n
P.2d at 88 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22).

Trujillo, 739

This

constitutionally mandated "reasonable suspicion" necessary to
justify detention has been codified in Utah law.

See Utah Code Ann.

§77-7-15 (1953 as amended); Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 88.
In State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 1988),
this Court outlined two "alternative" grounds for constitutionally
justifying the stop of a motor vehicle.
First, it could be based on specific, articulable
facts which, together with rational inferences
drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable
person to conclude Sierra had committed or was
about to commit a crime. [Citations omitted.]
Second, the stop could be incident to a lawful
citation for the traffic violation of driving
unlawfully in the left lane.
Id.

This Court first considered whether, given the totality of the

circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the seizure,
the officer had a constitutionally mandated reasonable suspicion and
determined that he did not.
The court next considered in Sierra the State's argument
that "the initial stop of the defendant was permissible because it
was incident to a lawful stop for a traffic violation."
977.

I_d. at

This Court disagreed, pointing out that officers cannot

randomly stop cars on public roads and that "it is impermissible for
law enforcement officers to use a misdemeanor arrest as a pretext to
search for evidence of a more serious crime.
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See United States v.

Millio, 588 P. Supp. 45, 49 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (Citations omitted)."
Id.

This Court also pointed out that in Taglavore v. United states,

291 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1961), the Court stated:
The violation of a constitutional right by a
subterfuge cannot be justified . . . were the use
of misdemeanor arrest warrants as a pretext for
searching people suspected of felonies to be
permitted, a mockery could be made of the fourth
amendment and its guarantees. The courts must be
vigilant to detect and prevent such a misuse of
legal processes.
Id.

To determine whether a stop for a traffic violation is a
pretext, the Court must consider the totality of the circumstances.
"Whether a fourth amendment violation has occurred 'turns on an
objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts
and circumstances confronting him at the time,' and not on the
officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was
taken (citations omitted)."

Id.

The Sierra Court concluded that a reasonable officer,
under the circumstances of that case, would not have stopped the
driver for remaining too long in the left lane and that, since the
surrounding circumstances indicated that the stop was a pretext, the
seizure was unconstitutional.
in State v. Arroyo, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (1989), this
Court again considered whether the initial stop of the defendant was
a pretext.
closely."

In Arroyo, the defendant was stopped for "following too
In that case, this Court again determined that a

reasonable officer would not have stopped the defendant except for
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"some unarticulated suspicion of more serious criminal activity."
.Id. at 35.
In the instant case, a reasonable officer, given the
totality of the circumstances, would not have stopped Mr. Smith for
an improper right turn.

As this Court pointed out in Sierra, "[t]he

proper inquiry does not focus on whether the officer could validly
have made the stop" but on whether a reasonable officer would have
made the stop. _Id. a t 978.
The officer in this case repeatedly asserted that the
reason he stopped the defendant was that the defendant made an
improper right turn without signaling (T. 14, 15, 41-2, 52-3).
However, the backup officer never saw a copy of the citation, even
though she was required to include a copy in her inventory paperwork
(T. 65). A review of the applicable statutes and ordinance raises a
question as to whether an improper turn was made in this case.
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-69 (1953 as amended) provides in
pertinent part:
(l)(a) A person may not turn a vehicle or move
right or left upon a roadway or change lanes until
the movement can be made with reasonable safety
and an appropriate signal has been given.
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-1 (1953 as amended) defines roadway as follows:
(37) "Roadway" means that portion of highway
improved, designed, or ordinarily used for
vehicular travel, exclusive of a sidewalk, berm,
or shoulder, even though any of them are used by
persons riding bicycles or other human-powered
vehicles. If a highway includes two or more
separate roadways, roadway refers to any roadway
separately but not to all roadways collectively.
(Emphasis added.)
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The Salt Lake City Code §12.44.130 contains a similar
provision.

It states:
No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection
unless the vehicle is in a proper position upon
the roadway, as required in §12.44.120, or its
successor, or turn a vehicle to enter a private
road or driveway, or otherwise turn a vehicle from
a direct course, or move right or left upon a
roadway unless and until such movement can be made
with reasonable safety. No person shall turn any
vehicle without giving an appropriate signal in
the manner hereinafter provided in the event any
other traffic may be affected by such movement.

(Emphasis added.)

Whether turning right from the parking lane into

a driveway immediately in front of the vehicle violates the improper
turning statute is questionable.

Because the statute explicitly

requires that the turn be made from the roadway, the question
becomes whether the parking lane off the traveled portion is
considered part of the roadway so as to require a signal. The
definition of roadway specifically excludes the berm or shoulder;
arguably, the parking lane which is not traveled fits within that
exclusion.
The Salt Lake City ordinance requires a signal "in the
event any other traffic may be affected by such movement."

It is

unclear from the phrase what being "affected by such movement"
means.

This

phrase

gives

police

officers the same unacceptable

breadth of discretion in deciding to stop a vehicle as did the
statutes in Sierra.
Furthermore, the evidence does not establish that other
traffic was "affected" by the movement, regardless of the meaning of
the term affected.

Defendant's vehicle was in the untraveled
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portion of the roadway and never entered the roadway.

Hence, even

if other cars were in the roadway, they would not have been
"affected" by the movement and therefore no violation occurred.

In

addition, the officer did not testify that other cars were in the
roadway at the time; the evidence sustains a finding only that the
officer's car was in the roadway, not that any other cars were
present or that the movement of defendant's vehicle "affected" the
officer's car in any way.
Furthermore, the manner in which the inventory search was
conducted suggests that the stop was a pretext and that in stopping
Mr. Smith, Officer Smith was looking for an opportunity to search
his vehicle.

After Officer Smith determined that he was going to

arrest Mr. Smith on a probation violation, the officer ascertained
that the vehicle was not properly registered.3

officer Smith had

already called a backup officer, and, when she arrived, Officer
Smith had decided to impound the vehicle because it was not properly
registered.

The backup officer, Officer Morgan, did an inventory

search as part of the impound procedure.
in State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court pointed out that "even if it could be determined that
the impoundment itself was reasonably necessary, the search of the
vehicle trunk was nevertheless not a valid inventory search."

The

Court pointed out that where an officer does not follow a

3 The officer's information regarding the registration
problem flowed from the initial illegal stop and was not known to
him at the time the stop was made.
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regularized set of procedures in inventorying a vehicle, the
inventory search may well be a pretext for a warrantless search.

In

Hygh, the officer did not give the defendant an opportunity to
arrange for the disposition of his property or otherwise involve the
defendant and did not completely search the vehicle or make a list
of the items seized.

The Court held that the inventory was a

pretext for a warrantless search and therefore unlawful and
suppressed the evidence.
In the present case, although Officer Morgan testified
that she followed a checklist, she did not ask Mr. Smith if anything
of value was in the vehicle or otherwise involve him in the
inventorying (T. 63). Officer Smith told her the nature of
Mr. Smith's probation violation which alerted her to look for
drug-related items. While the failure to involve Mr. Smith in the
inventory was not as egregious as the officer's actions in Hygh, it
nevertheless further suggests that Officer Smith's detention of
Mr. Smith for an improper turn was a pretext.
Even if a technical violation did occur in this case, a
reasonable police officer would not have cited the driver except for
"some unarticulated suspicion of more serious criminal activity."
See Arroyo, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35. As was the case in Sierra,
the officer in the present case was "suspicious" or had an inkling
regarding Mr. Smith before he saw Mr. Smith commit any purported
traffic violation (T. 11-12; see Sierra, 754 P.2d at 980). Right
turns without signals from the shoulder or even the roadway occur
frequently and often go unnoticed.

Here, where the car moved only a
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few feet to a driveway directly in front of it, a reasonable officer
would not have cited the driver but for some unarticulated and
unacceptable hunch.
In addition, the officer in this case did not have a
reasonable articulable suspicion so as to justify the stop. While
the officer repeatedly stated that he stopped Mr. Smith for an
improper turn, he also pointed out that he was "suspicious" when he
first saw a person leaning into the car window and that the area was
a high crime area where both prostitution and drug use were
prevalent.

These circumstances fail to justify the stop.
In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987), this

Court determined that an officer's decision to stop defendant was
based initially on two factors, one of which was the high amount of
crime in the area.

This Court held that the seizure of the

defendant was unconstitutional—the detention of the defendant being
unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment.

In

State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986), the officer cited the
"high crime area" factor as one of the bases for his suspicion of
criminal behavior on the part of the defendants.

The Utah Supreme

Court's per curiam decision did not address the issue specifically,
but since the Court held that the information known to the officer
did not justify the stop, it can be inferred that the high crime
area factor was insufficient to justify the challenged stop.
In People v. Bower, 24 Cal. 3rd 638, 645, 597 P.2d 115,
119 (Cal. 1979), the California Supreme Court recognized that many
citizens shop, work, play, transact business, visit, or live in
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areas that have high crime rates.

The Court noted that "[t]he

spectrum of legitimate human behavior occurs every day in so-called
crime areas.

As a result, this Court has appraised this factor with

caution and has been relunctant to conclude that a location's crime
rate transforms otherwise innocent-appearing circumstances into
circumstances justifying the seizure of an individual.

Id.

(citations omitted) .
In State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), this
Court analogized Mr. Seryfs arrival from Florida as a basis for a
reasonable suspicion to the testimony in State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d
181 (Utah 1987)f that Interstate 15 was often used by illegal aliens
from Mexico.

Id.

at 18. This Court pointed out that the fact that

a person got off a flight which originated in Florida did not amount
to an objective fact upon which a reasonable suspicion could be
based just as the fact that a person was traveling on 1-15 did not
support a reasonable suspicion in Mendoza.

This Court noted:

In Mendoza, the Court considered it unlikely that
illegal alien transporters comprised a significant
portion of 1-15 traffic. It seems equally
unlikely that drug couriers comprise a significant
portion of the travelers through Salt Lake
International Airport, even of those whose flight
originated in Florida.
Id. at 18. Applying the analyses of Mendoza and Sery to the instant
case, it seems just as unlikely that persons who are involved with
drugs or prostitution comprise a significant portion of the people
on State Street, and information that a person was leaning through a
window talking to a driver of a car which was parked at the side of
the road is not a fact upon which a constitutionally sound
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reasonable suspicion could be based.
Furthermore, leaning against an open window of a car to
talk with a driver is not an unusual circumstance and is just as
consistent with innocent behavior as any other type of behavior.
The officer did not know whether the person was male or female and,
according to his testimony, saw no more than the figure of a person
leaning against a car.

While an "officer is entitled to assess the

facts in light of his experience" (Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 88-89), it
is also "imperative that the facts be judged against an objective
standard []" which would "warrant a [person] of reasonable caution
in the belief that the action taken was appropriate[.]"

Trujillo,

739 P.2d at 88.
Officer Smith offered no interpretation as to why a
person leaning against the car made him suspicious.

It could have

simply been the fact that two individuals were talking in what the
officer perceived to be a high crime area.

This is very similar to

the facts in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and does not pass
constitutional muster.
Hence, the State did not sustain its burden of
establishing that the seizure in the instant case was lawful, and
the subsequent inventory search of Mr. Smithfs car therefore
violated his fourth amendment rights.

All of the fruits which

flowed from the initial illegal detention, including all of the
items seized during the search of his car, should be suppressed.
Mr. Smith respectfully requests that those items be suppressed and
that this Court reverse his conviction and remand his case to the
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trial court with an order for either dismissal or suppression of the
illegally seized evidence.

POINT II. THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR REHEARING ON MOTION TO
SUPPRESS.
In articulating his decision, the trial judge mentioned
at least three times that the defendant had not testified and that
relying on the testimony of the officer, it appeared that there had
been no seizure (T. 85, 92). Following the denial of the motion to
suppress, defendant filed a motion for rehearing on the motion to
suppress.

Attached to that motion was an affidavit of defense

counsel which proffered the testimony of Mr. Smith.
Addendum B.

See

Defense counsel was essentially asking the court to

rehear the matter and allow her to present the defendant's testimony
(R. 31-33).
According to the affidavit, if the defendant were to
testify, he would testify that (a) Officer B. L. Smith stopped him
with flashing overhead lights while he was parked on the untraveled
portion of the street; (b) when the officer pulled behind him with
his overhead lights, defendant then pulled into the Alta Motel
parking lot; (c) the officer immediately requested the defendant to
show his arms and the officer then inspected them for track marks
(R. 31). The trial judge refused to rehear the matter despite the
fact that the case was set for trial before him shortly after the
time that the motion for rehearing was heard (R. 34, Transcript of
Hearing held November 28, 1988 at 11-12).
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The judge's refusal to

rehear the motion to suppress, despite the procedural posture of the
case and the fact that if the defendant's proffered testimony were
believed, the earlier ruling on the motion to suppress was
erroneous, violated the interests of justice and fairness and was
erroneous.
In Utah, in order to preserve an issue raised in a motion
to suppress, the defendant must make a specific objection to the use
of the evidence at trial.
1983).

See State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah

The purpose of requiring an objection at trial is to enable

the trial judge to reconsider his decision and have "an opportunity
to avoid error in the trial which may have been created by an
improper ruling on a pretrial motion . . . ." J^d. at 82.
In her concurring opinion in State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d
1069 (Utah 1987),2 Justice Durham emphasized "the obligation of
defense counsel to notify judges who have ruled on pretrial
suppression issues that defendant's objections to challenged
evidence are reserved and not withdrawn, thus alerting those judges
to the possibility that trial evidence may affect the validity of
earlier rulings."

IQ. at 1076.

She pointed out that trial judges

must be given the opportunity to reassess the evidence and their
pretrial rulings "if there is any likelihood they were erroneous."

In the present case, the testimony of Officer Smith did

2

Justices Howe and Zimmerman concurred in the concurring
opinion of Justice Durham.
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not give a clear picture of the events surrounding the initial stop
of the appellant or of the actions of the officer immediately after
he approached the appellant.

Despite the ambiguity of the officerfs

testimony and the State's burden to establish that the seach of the
vehicle was lawful, the trial court determined that the officer did
not "seize" the defendant and that, even if he did, such seizure was
reasonable.

Regardless of the ultimate holding of this Court on the

issues raised in Point I of this brief, it is apparent that it is a
close question as to whether the search in this case violated the
fourth amendment.

Under such circumstances, a rehearing on the

motion to suppress was appropriate.
Had this matter been tried, defendant could have
testified to the proffered evidence.

Such evidence, if believed by

the trial court, would have changed the trial court's ruling as to
whether the officer stopped the defendant since, according to the
defendant's testimony, the officer, with his overhead lights
flashing, pulled in behind the defendant while he was still parked
on the street (R. 32). Furthermore, such evidence should have
altered the court's ruling as to whether the traffic stop was a
pretext since, according to the defendant's proffer, the officer
immediately checked his arms for needle track marks after stopping
him.
This matter was set for trial before the court a week
after the motion for rehearing was heard (R. 34) but was ultimately
resolved at the same time that the motion for rehearing was heard
(R. 39). Given the factual closeness of this case, the trial

- 28 -

court's emphasis on the fact that the defendant did not testify at
the suppression hearing (T. 85, 92), the significant gaps in Officer
Smith's testimony and questions left as to what actually occurred,
the trial court should have granted defendant's motion in the
interests of justice to insure that its prior ruling was fair and
just.
The procedural posture of this case at the time of the
motion for rehearing buttresses Mr. Smith's position.

The judge

knew he was about to try the case, and it would have taken only a
few minutes to hear Mr. Smith's testimony.
Defense counsel made every attempt to insure that the
concerns in Johnson and Lesley were met.

The trial judge, on the

other hand, simply did not care to reassess the evidence despite the
fact that an injustice may well have been done.

By presenting her

proffer, asking for rehearing, and preserving her right to appeal,
defense counsel did all that was possible in the context of this
case to preserve this issue for review by this Court.
Mr. Smith is not arguing that in all cases a trial judge
must be required to grant rehearing on a motion to suppress.
However, in rare cases such as this where it appears that the
interests of justice will be best served by granting such a motion,
such a rehearing should be allowed to preserve the integrity of the
system and the fairness of the result.
The trial judge erred in denying the motion for
rehearing, and, in the event this Court does not reverse and remand
this case pursuant to the issues raised in Point I of this brief,
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the matter should nevertheless be reversed for rehearing and
redetermination of the motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Smith
respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction and
remand the case to the trial court with an order of dismissal or
suppression of the illegally seized evidence, or, in the
alternative, remand the case for rehearing on the motion to suppress.
Respectfully submitted this
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ADDENDUM A

1

like to review them with respect to that.

2

THE COURT:

Thank you.

3

THE COURT:

I'm generally familiar with these

4

cases that you note Ms. Palacios.

5

MR. LEMCKE:

6

MS. PALACIOS:

7

THE COURT:

Submit the matter?

State submits, Your Honor.
We'd submit it, Your Honor.

Really, I think this case boils

8

down to the simple question of whether or not there was a

9

stop in the classic sense. A stop as I read the cases

10

both State and federal are when a police officer for

11

whatever reason because of the fact that the individual

12

is a police officer, and he has —

13

a marked car, usually a marked car with blinking lights

14

and all those things that signal to a driver that a

15

police officer wants him to pull over.

16

extreme circumstances there may be some action taken with

17

the vehicle to pull over an individual, particularly if

18

they are inclined not to pull over.

19

he may or may not have

I suppose in

But the point is, there's got to be some type of a

20

stop that would not have been made but for the police

21

officer's presence, and request that the individual stop.

22

And as I hear the testimony in this case, and I

23

haven't heard a thing from the defendant, so I don't know

24

what his version is, and I must assume it's the same, but

25

in any event, the long and the short of it is, I have a
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police officer that tells me that he's driving in an
area, and it may be high crime, and I haven't read a case
that says you ignore traffic violations just because it's
high crime.

I've read cases that said you can't use a

traffic stop as a ruse, or you can't use a high crime
area as a basis for pulling somebody over.
to be a reason.

There's got

But certainly if there's a violation of

the law, whether it's a high crime area or not, it seems
to me that Officer Smith was obligated to follow up on
that violation, minor as it may be, turning without
appropriate signals.
As I read the city ordinance here with regard to
turn signals, and taking into account the location, not
the location because it's a high crime area, but the
location it's on State Street, and I believe it occurred
about midnight, I don't have the day of the week, but we
know there was at least one car immediately behind, or
close behind Mr. Smith's automobile when he pulled
forward, and turned into the driveway.

I think the law

is, from a traffic standpoint, based on what I read here,
that he had an obligation to signal. Whether he happened
to^ be parked on the side of the road or not is
irrelevant, or whether he was in one of the travel lanes.
But in any event, it appears to me, and I don't know
what happened to the traffic citation, whether it was
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contested, and whether there was a resolution with regard
to that, and whether that was a violation of the law, or
whether Mr. Smith ignored it. But in any event, it
certainly indicates to me that there's an obligation,
assuming there's nothing more pressing elsewhere, a drug
deal, for Officer Smith to look into that failure to
signal.
But the evidence I have, even more importantly, is
that Mr. Smith parked his vehicle, stopped his vehicle,
pulled into a parking place before the officer pulled him
over.

The evidence, as I hear it, just merely indicates

to me that Officer Smith pulled in. Whether or not Mr.
Smith knew he was there, I don't have the faintest idea
because I don't have any testimony in that regard.

I do

know that he pulled into the parking area of the Alta
Motel, pulled into a parking space, and apparently did
that all before Officer Smith had arrived on the scene.
There's not even any indication one way or the other, and
one way or the other doesn't give any evidence at all as
to whether or not he even had any overhead lights on, or
made any indications with his spotlights that he wanted
Mr. Smith to stop.
The evidence, as I hear it, is that Mr. Smith made
a voluntary stop.

At that point in time pulled into the

parking area in Alta Motel, and stopped.

And then got
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1

out of his car when he saw the police officer. Maybe it

2

all happened about the same time.

3

a stop in the true sense.

4

wrong with the stop, because there wasn't a stop.

5

I don't believe it was

And so I don't find anything

But even if there was, I'm satisfied that there's

6

sufficient reason for Officer Smith to follow the vehicle

7

in there. And had he not voluntarily stopped, he could

8

have pulled him over for that traffic violation.

9

see anything wrong with that.

I don't

10

As far as the things that occurred there

11

afterwards, it certainly appears to me that there was

12

nothing that Officer Smith did with regard to inquiry of

13

the defendant in this case, Mr. Smith, as to who he was,

14

and what he was doing.

15

who he was.

16

registration on the car, nothing unusual about that, and

17

certainly not improper for a police officer under

18

appropriate circumstances to ask for those things of any

19

citizens.

20

It's all routine.

He asked him

He asked for identification.

He asked for

And then he finds out that apparently by voluntary

21

information that Mr. Smith is on parole.

He makes

22

further inquiry based on that.

23

those things that's happened.

24

warrant, takes him into custody.

25

what appears to be a voluntary statement, and a lack of

Nothing wrong with any of
He finds out there's a
He finds out based upon
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registration on the part of Mr. Smith, that the vehicle
is improperly tagged by way of license plates.

1 can't

find anything wrong with impounding the vehicle.
The manner in which the search was conducted by
Officer Morgan appears to be in conformance with not only
policy, but good practice.

This is not a separate

container in a trunk that I have to worry about, this is
something rolled up in a pair of levis laying out on the
seat.

And prudence dictates, and I'd be surprised if a

reasonable and competent officer did not look in rolled
up clothing to see if there might be a weapon or other
contraband.

It would be inappropriate not to do that.

And I think the Supreme Court's ruled precisely on those
issues with regard to the nature of the search that can
be done in a stop that might be questioned with regard to
looking for firearms, and other contraband if for no
other reason protection of the public and police officer.
So, I don't see anything wrong with the inventory
that was all pursuant to impounding the vehicle.

I am

concerned, however, about the statements made by Mr.
Smith enroute to the police station.

It seems to me that

while good police work would certainly suggest that one
ought to inquiry to see if a suspect can provide
information that might lead to ferreting out those that
deal in drugs, it's appropriate where the State is going
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1

to rely at least in part on the statements of the

2

defendant in this case as to what his intentions were

3

with the drugs that were found, it's incumbent upon the

4

police officer to suggest to the arrested person, in this

5

case Mr. Smith, that anything —

61

remain silent. And whether or not that would have made

7

any difference isn't the issue.

8
91

that he has a right to

The issue raised is it's pretty routine to begin
with. And if police officers want to talk to people

10

after they've arrested them, then I think they ought to

11

comply with the law. And that is that you've got to

12

advise a person of his Miranda rights, and failure to do

13

that, except in some rare circumstances, prohibits the

14

introduction of any statements that might be made,

15

particularly under circumstances where the conversation

16

is suggesting that there might be some advantageous

17

position that the defendant might gain by cooperating.

18

Kind of suggests to a defendant that now is the time to

19

talk, because I may be able to do something for you, if

20

you want to cooperate.

21

If you're going to ask those things, it's got to

22

be after Miranda so that it's clear that the defendant

23

has no obligation to speak, at least until the

24

defendant's attorney is there.

25

that was made by Mr. Smith enroute that might be relied

So, I think any statement
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1

upon for the State to prove any portion of the case, and

2

I particularly see that as a key element —

3

of the elements of the intent, I think I'm required to

4

suppress, and the motion it granted in that regard.

5

at least one

As far as the motion to suppress the contraband,

6

the drugs and other items that were found in the vehicle

7

the defendant was driving, that motion is denied.

8

There's no basis for it.

9

in part.

10

MS. PALACIOS:

I grant it in part, and deny it

Your Honor, may I have a

11

clarification on the court's ruling for the record?

12

court indicated that you found that there was no stop,

13

because the vehicle was already stopped.

14

THE COURT: Yes.

15

MS. PALACIOS:

The

I'd just like to point out to

16

the court, and I checked the case to make sure in State

17

versus Carpenia, the officers followed a vehicle, and

18

then put the lights on, and the vehicle stopped into the

19

driveway of the person who lived there.

20

evidence in that case whether or not they would have

21

pulled over voluntarily or not. This court then is

22

saying that the fact that he had already pulled into the

23

driveway and stopped means that it's not a police stop.

24
25

THE COURT:

So, there is no

You can't have a stop unless the

police tell the person to stop is what I'm saying, and I

Page 91
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR

1

see a distinction in that case.

Just because he happened

2

to be at his driveway, and they flip on the overheads, he

3

would have stopped in his driveway, or stopped in the

4

street if he hadn't been in front of his house.

5

a difference.

6

evidence, and maybe somebody else looks at it different,

7j

but at least everything I hear is Mr. Smith started his

8

car up, maybe it's because he saw the police officer,

9

maybe because he didn't.

What we have here —

There's

what I see from the

Anyway he pulled in there, and

10

parked his vehicle in a stall in the Alta Motel provided

11

for parking.

12

all that voluntarily, stopped his car voluntarily.

13

don't view that to be a stop even though a police officer

14

may have been behind him.

15

knew he was there.

16

And the only evidence I've got is he did

M S . PALACIOS:

I don't know if Mr. Smith even

What about the officer saying

17

that he had stopped to give him a ticket.

18

evidence of a stop?

19

THE COURT:

No.

And I

Isn't that

That means the police officer

20

was going to pull him over to give him a ticket, but

21

never did.

22

unless the person pulls over because of the police

23

officers.

24
25

You can't have a stop by a police officer

I think that's pretty clear.
M S . PALACIOS:

I disagree, but I'll submit

that, Your Honor.
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ADDENDUM B

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah
FRANCES M. PALACIOS (#2502)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

NOV -7 1988

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
THE STATE OF UTAH,

STATE OF UTAH

MOTION FOR REHEARING ON
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
V.
Case No. 881991297
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

JEROME SMITH,
Defendant

The defendant, JEROME SMITH, by and through his attorney of
record, FRANCES M. PALACIOS, hereby moves the Court for a rehearing
on defendant's motion to suppress evidence previously held and
denied on Tuesday, November 1, 1988 based upon the grounds stated in
the attached affidavit and in the interests of justice.
DATED this

V

day, November, 1988.
Respectfully Submitted,

FRANCES M.'PALACIOS
Attorney for Defendant
floor*** Ccu*tc£-.
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to Mr. -James Cope
of the County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84111, this

7

day of Novemb.er, 1988.

FRANCES M. PALACIOS, (#2502)
Attorney for Defendant
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

NOV - 7 1988
/ I

i H i n c ^ Clerk 3rd Dtet. Court

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF
DEFENSE COUNSEL

Plaintiff,
VS.

JEROME SMITH,
Defendant,

Civil No,

State of Utah

)

County of Salt Lake

)

881991297

:SS

FRANCES M. PALACIOS, being first duly sworn, deposes
and says
1) That I am attorney for the above-named defendant,
JEROME SMITH, and I represented Mr. Smith in the
motion to suppress held on Tuesday, November 1,
1988.
2) That my client informed me that:
a) Officer B. L. Smith stopped behind him with
flashing overhead lights while he was parked on the
untraveled portion of the street.
b) when the officer pulled behind him with his
overhead lights, defendant the)? pulled into the Alta
Motel parking lot.
c) the officer immediately requested the defendant
to show his arms and the officer then inspected
them for track marks;

all'contrary to Officer B. L. Smith's testimony at
the suppression hearing.
3) I advised my client, based upon my understanding of
the law, that the testimony of the officer was
sufficient grounds upon which tj^vjievAil
in our
motion to suppress and thereforeAneea not testify,
4) That in the course of the court's findings, the
court remarked approximately three times that the
defendant had not testified, that there was no
stop, and that was based in part upon the fact that
there were no overhead lights.
5) That, after hearing the court's findings , it
became clear that my advise was erroneously given
and the interest of justice would be served by
allowing the defendant to testify and supplement
the record m a rehearing on a motion to suppress,
DATED this

[

day of November, 1988.

^FRANCES M. PALACIOS
Attorney for Defendant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

I

day of

November, 1988.
NOTARY PUBLIC

Residmgj^t Salt Lake City
My Commission Expires:

